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Abstract
We identify the causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on non-
employment duration in Norway by exploiting a discontinuity in eligibility
at age 50. We find that a severance payment worth 1.2 months’ earnings at
the median lowers the fraction re-employed after a year by seven percent-
age points. Data on household wealth enable us to verify that the effect
is decreasing in prior wealth, which favors an interpretation as liquidity
constraints over the alternative of mental accounting. Finding liquidity
constraints in Norway, despite its equitable wealth distribution and gen-
erous welfare state, means they are likely to exist also in other countries.
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1 Introduction
Are unemployed households liquidity-constrained, so that they have to accept a
job offer earlier than would be optimal? This is the argument implied by Card
et al. (2007a), based on evidence that Austrian job losers eligible for lump-sum
severance payments take more time until their next job than do their non-eligible
counterparts. Together with Chetty (2008), which shows theoretically how liq-
uidity constraints can affect job search duration and finds longer durations for
those with (possibly endogenously) greater financial resources in the United
States, this has transformed the unemployment duration literature, which hith-
erto had assumed that unemployment insurance (UI) prolonged search duration
exclusively by distorting the relative price of being unemployed rather than
employed (“moral hazard”).1
Yet two questions remain: First, how generalizable are these findings from
Austria and the United States to other countries? The question arises because
both countries grant UI only for a relatively short period, maximally 6 months
in normal times,2 and because especially the United States has a more unequal
wealth distribution than the majority of OECD economies. Hence, one might
think that smaller or no liquidity constraints will exist in most other OECD
economies. Second, does the reduced-form effect of severance payments indeed
reflect liquidity constraints in the sense that households are unable to spend
more resources while out of work, or is some alternative mechanism at play?
As a possible alternative we suggest mental accounting, whereby households
do have enough resources of their own, or could borrow them from financial
institutions, but after job loss are less willing to spend prior savings than to
spend severance pay money.
1For examples, see Katz and Meyer (1990) or Lalive et al. (2006).
2After that period, households can still receive “unemployment assistance”, which is how-
ever lower and means-tested.
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The present paper addresses both of these questions. First, we investigate
whether severance payments prolong job search in Norway, which has one of
the world’s most generous UI systems, replacing 62% of prior income for up to
2 years, and also has one of the rich world’s most equitable wealth distribu-
tions. Despite these circumstances, which may be thought to render liquidity
constraints less likely, we find clear evidence of a causal severance pay effect.
The severance pay amounts to about 1.2 months of net-of-tax median earnings,
which allow the job-seeker to “top up” from the 62% replacement rate provided
by the UI system to 100% of his prior income for about 3.2 months. These
payments are found to increase average non-employment duration by about a
month, and to reduce the fractions re-employed after 12 months by 6-7 percent-
age points, which corresponds to a relative reduction of about 12 percent. Thus,
severance pay effects do not seem to be specific to countries with relatively short
maximum UI durations.
Second, we investigate whether this effect does indeed reflect liquidity con-
straints, as put forward in Card et al. (2007a) and Chetty (2008). In particu-
lar, we discuss the alternative interpretation of mental accounting in the spirit
of Shefrin and Thaler (1988). In this scenario, even households with enough
other financial resources prolong their job search only if they receive severance
payments, because they hesitate to tap the other resources for the purpose of
longer job search. Under the assumption that the strength of potential mental
accounting is invariant to prior wealth3 we can discriminate between the two
scenarios, because in a world of liquidity constraints the severance pay effect
will clearly be decreasing in prior (liquid) wealth. Since, in contrast to Card
et al. (2007a), we are able to observe various measures of household wealth, we
can test this, and we find that the effect is indeed decreasing in prior wealth.
3 We investigate the plausibility of this assumption in Section 5.
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In fact, no statistically significant effect is found for those with above-median
wealth. This evidence favors an interpretation of the severance pay effect as
reflecting liquidity constraints rather than mental accounting.
Our identification exploits the fact that in severance pay agreements con-
cluded between the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise and the Norwegian
Confederation of Trade Unions, only those aged above 50 on the day of their job
separation are eligible for payments. This allows us to implement a regression
discontinuity design (RDD), comparing those aged just above 50 to those aged
just below. A number of tests verify that the two groups are statistically identi-
cal along the relevant dimensions. Furthermore, the mechanism of the pay-outs,
which are made by a joint fund financed by firms in a not experience-rated way,
ensures that, as we verify in the data, there is no selective lay-off behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the
Norwegian severance pay program and discusses our empirical strategy. Section
3 introduces the data. Section 4 presents the general results on the effect of
lump-sum severance payments on job search duration, and Section 5 addresses
theoretically and empirically the possibility of mental accounting behavior. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
The challenge in identifying the causal effect of severance payments in most
empirical setups is that eligibility or amounts typically depend on factors like
age, tenure or prior earnings, which however are likely to be correlated with non-
employment duration also through other channels. To address this problem, we
exploit a rule under which employees separated from their job just before the
age of 50 are not eligible for severance pay, whereas those aged just above 50
4
are. In the immediate neighborhood of the discontinuity all other factors that
might influence our outcomes of interest can be expected to be statistically
identical, so that any discontinuity in outcomes can be attributed credibly to
the discontinuity in severance pay.
While many firms in Norway have heterogeneous severance pay rules at the
firm level, those who are members of Norway’s Confederation of Trade Unions,
"Landsorganisasjonen i Norge" (LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prise, "Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon" (NHO), have agreed on common rules
about eligibility and amounts of severance pay ("Sluttvederlag", SLV) paid to
employees who are involuntarily separated from their jobs. The LO is Norway’s
largest and most influential workers’ organization, covering about 850,000 Nor-
wegian employees, or one-third of the Norwegian labor force. A key advantage
of the LO-NHO agreement for our identification is that actual payments are
made not by firms, but by a fund to which firms contribute each month accord-
ing to their number of full-time employees, and not according to past layoffs.
As our sensitivity tests verify, this ensures that there is no manipulation of the
threshold in the sense of firms trying to systematically lay off workers just below
or just above age 50.4
For the 15 years for which we have data, 1995-2010, the assigned amount
of severance pay varied along three dimensions: By job tenure, by age, and
across 4 periods. Firstly individuals were required to have at least 10 years of
tenure in their current plant or at least 15 years of tenure in a combination
of participating plants. In our data we observe any job start date after 1992.
Therefore we know exact tenure for those who started their last job in or after
1992. By contrast for someone who started his last job in, say, 1990 and quit in
4For further information on LO, NHO, and their joint scheme, see http://www.lo-nho-
ordningene.no/
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1998, we will only know that he must have started before 1992 and hence have
at least 6 years of tenure, but we do then not know whether or not his tenure
does also exceed the 10 years required for severance pay eligibility. Therefore we
are not able to exploit tenure as a RDD assignment variable, and we restrict our
sample to those known to have had at least 10 years of tenure, so that everyone
in our sample did satisfy the tenure requirement for severance pay.
The second dimension and the one we exploit is age. As Figure 1 shows,
severance pay amounts increased from zero to NOK 18,000 at age 50.5 This
provides a setup for RDD analysis. There are also further increases at ages 52,
54, 56, 58, 59 and 60, as well as annual decreases after age 60. However the
other increases until and including the one at age 59 are rather small, and at and
above 60 other simultaneous discontinuities apply, in particular in access to early
retirement, thus violating the exclusion restriction required for identification.
Therefore we focus on the discontinuity at age 50. With a view to the next, albeit
small discontinuity at age 52, our baseline specification uses a bandwidth of only
2 years, but using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth of
in our case 3 years turns out to produce quantitatively very similar estimates,
at greater statistical precision due to the larger sample size.
Finally, within our period of observation the precise amount paid out at age
50 was adjusted twice. It amounted to NOK 12,000 until September 1995, NOK
14,400 until July 2002, and NOK 18,000 thereafter. Most of our observations
come from the last period, and so the average amount individuals in our sam-
ple were eligible for if aged between 50 and 52 was NOK 16,924 or $2,500 at
2004 exchange rates.6 It is worth noting that these amounts do not depend on
prior earnings, so we may expect the same amount to have a larger effect on
5At the 2004 exchange rate of 6.7 NOK per USD, this corresponds to about $2,700.
6For an overview of the exact severance pay amounts by period and age, see Table 2.
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those with lower previous incomes than on those with higher incomes. Median
monthly earnings after taxes (the relevant point of reference, since severance
payments are not being taxed) amounted to $ 2,158 (see Table 1), so the pay-
ments amounted to about 1.2 monthly after-tax incomes for the median earner.
It would thus have allowed him to “top up” from the 62% UI replacement rate to
100% of his former income for about 3 months, and top up to lower replacement
rates correspondingly longer.
For those aged between 48 and 52 and known to have had 10 or more years
of tenure, we estimate the following equation for different outcome measures y :
yi = α+ βTi + γzi + δTizi + εi (1)
Here T is an indicator for being aged above 50, z is the forcing variable
(age-50), and ε is a mean-zero error term. So essentially we estimate the effect
of being aged above 50, while controlling for the effect of age per se. Since
we can make the interval small, we rely on a linear control for age,7 and we
allow the effect of age to differ on the two sides of the discontinuity. The
specification does also allow us to add an interaction of T with different measures
of wealth when we investigate how the severance pay effect varies with prior
wealth. To maximize transparency and facilitate interaction of the treatment
indicator with further covariates, our baseline specification uses a rectangular
kernel, thus weighting each observation equally. This can be implemented by
simply estimating Equation 1 by Ordinary Least Squares. The sensitivity checks
7Our point estimates change very little if we instead control for age using a second order
polynomial.
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reveal that our results are robust to the alternative use of a triangular kernel,
which assigns greater weight to observations closer to the threshold and which
Fan and Gijbels (1996) showed in general to be preferable for RDD purposes.8
3 Data
We use administrative data from the FD-Trygd events database of Statistics
Norway, covering the universe of Norwegian residents. We start with informa-
tion on all job separations by male employees occurring between 1995 and 2010.9
We then merge in information obtained from the LO-NHO office on which plants
were participating in the agreement and restrict to those that were.10 Further-
more, we add information from FD-trygd on exact age at the day of the job
separation, and we restrict the main sample to those aged between 48 (inclu-
sive) and 52 (exclusive) on the day of their job separation.
Since we do not explicitly observe which of the job separations are involun-
tary (another requirement for receiving severance pay), we exclude cases (using
information from FD-Trygd) in which the job separation is likely to occur be-
cause of some other event, after which individuals are likely not to be searching
for a new job. These are, first, separators receiving disability pension in the
year of their job separation, second, those on parental leave (given the gender
and age range of the sample, these are very few), and third, those who start
a new job just the day after the separation or return to the same firm within
3 months. All these restrictions will reduce the fraction of voluntary quitters,
but they may also introduce bias due to endogenous sample selection. Luckily,
8For background papers on the RDD approach, see Trochim (1984), Imbens and Lemieux
(2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010).
9We focus on males as even in Norway females earn significantly less than their husbands
and they typically work part time.
10General employment information is available from 1992 onward, but it is only from 1995
onward that we know plant identifiers.
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however, we find that our point estimates change very little when we lift any or
all of these restrictions.
Since severance pay eligibility requires at least 10 years of plant tenure, we
restrict the sample accordingly. We drop individuals who started their last job
before 1992 (for whom we cannot observe the exact start date) and who are
separated from it before 2002 since we are unable to know whether their full
tenure was above or below 10 years. This reduces the sample size significantly,
but it guarantees that everyone in our sample does satisfy the tenure requirement
for severance pay, so that the discontinuity at the age threshold reflects as closely
as possible the full treatment effect of the payment.
A last restriction from our data is that we do not observe the amounts
actually received, as would be necessary to compute the Wald estimate of the
effect of actual severance pay on job search duration. Instead, like Card et
al. (2007a), we can only estimate the reduced-form or intention-to-treat (ITT)
effect of severance pay eligibility, which constitutes a lower bound on the effect
of actual severance pay. But with the other sample restrictions in place, as
explained above, and since the claim forms are sent to the LO-NHO office by
the employer together with the layoff notification, we can expect compliance to
be rather high, and so our ITT estimates are expected to be not much below
the corresponding Wald estimates.
We follow Card et al. (2007a) in using as outcome variable "non-employment
duration", defined as the number of days from layoff until the start of a new
job, as opposed to the duration of registered unemployment. Their argument,
based on the findings in Card et al. (2007b), is that people may cease to register
as unemployed once their benefit eligibility runs out.11
11An additional reason in our case is that, as maintained for instance by Bratsberg et al.
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Our first and most natural outcome measure then is the completed duration
of job search. One drawback of this measure is that we observe it only for those
who start a new job by December 2010. Furthermore, this measure is somewhat
sensitive to the choice of the duration after which we censor. Card et al. (2007a)
censor after 6 months, on the grounds that this is the maximum UI duration in
their sample. In our case the same argument speaks for censoring after 2 years.
However, for someone who has not returned to work after 18 months we do not
know whether his complete non-employment duration is 19 months or 24 or 40,
yet we do know that he was not back in work after 12 months. This suggests as
sensible outcome variables the fractions re-employed after respectively 12, 15,
and 18 months.12
Taking this idea further, we also estimate a Cox regression in which the de-
pendent variable is (the logarithm of) the hazard rate, i.e. a person’s propensity
to start a new job given that he has not yet done so so far. This allows us to
estimate the effect of severance pay on the hazard in any given day since job loss
without having to specify whether in general the hazard is increasing, decreasing
or flat in the time elapsed, however it does require us to assume that the effect
is the same at all stages of the spell.13 Given that we find the largest effect of
severance pay on the reemployment fractions after 15 and 18 months, we censor
the Cox regression for non-employment spells at 15 months. The point estimate
we get when censoring after 18 is very similar, and for censoring after 12 or 24
(2010), many individuals who would be labeled as unemployed in other countries draw on
disability insurance instead of unemployment insurance in Norway. Similar considerations
about moral hazard vs. liquidity constraints apply to those on disability pension as to those
on regular unemployment insurance (see for instance Autor and Duggan (2007)). In any case,
when we perform the analyses excluding any household ever receiving disability pension in
our observation window, our main results remain unchanged.
12We have also looked at shorter and longer horizons. Effects there go in the same direction,
but tend to be smaller. Likely this is the case because at shorter horizons constraints are not
yet binding, whereas at longer horizons only a smaller and more selected sample of individuals
are still without a job.
13See Cox (1972) for the original outline of the Cox Proportional Hazard model, or Card et
al. (2007a) for another recent application.
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months slightly lower in absolute values.
A final data issue to be discussed is the measure of wealth. In view of
the previous literature on liquidity constraints of households (Gruber (2001),
Chetty and Szeidl (2007)), the most suitable definition of wealth should be
financial wealth – including deposits, bonds, stocks and mutual funds, but not
real estate – and measured at the household rather than the individual level,
i.e. adding in also the wealth, if any, of the spouse. Nonetheless it is conceivable
that transaction costs for stocks and bonds are so high that households use only
deposits, or that transaction costs for real estate are so low that households can
swap their house to finance their job search, or that many married individuals
keep their budgets sufficiently separate that individual holdings matter more
than a household’s total holdings. Fortunately, our data set is comprehensive
enough that we can use total wealth, financial wealth and deposits alone, and
each of these both at the individual and at the household level, thus allowing
us to see how robust findings are to the use of different measures.14
Of course how long someone can sustain the household with a given amount
of savings will depend on the monthly expenditures such as monthly rent, insur-
ance payments etc, which in turn will be highly correlated with prior income.
On these grounds we have also repeated our analyses using not absolute wealth,
but wealth relative to average income (across 3 years) before the job separation.
This yields results similar to those based on absolute wealth.
Table 1 shows in the left panel the summary statistics for the sample on
which our main, bandwidth 2 results are based, and in the right panel those
for a placebo sample. Individuals in the latter sample, used for some of the
14All wealth measures are recorded at the end of the last calendar year before the one of
the job separation. The quality of the real estate values in the data set is highly questionable,
and it is thus reassuring that our results do not depend on one particular measure of wealth.
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sensitivity checks below, satisfy all the same requirements as those in the main
sample, except that they come from plants not participating in the severance
pay agreement. Both samples have mean and median ages of about 50, and
tenure of about 16 years at the mean and 14 at the median. Uncensored non-
employment duration among those for whom the next job start is observed in
the sample (corresponding figure for the placebo sample in parentheses) is about
9 (10.5) months at the mean and 2 (3) at the median. About 40 (46) percent
have less than high-school education, 25 (30) percent have a high school degree,
and 35 (23) percent have a college degree. Average annual income before taxes
is about US$ 43,000 and household financial wealth about US$ 40,000 at the
mean.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Our main results are displayed in Table 3 and Figures 2 through 5. The ta-
ble reports the coefficients from estimating Equation 1: With the conservative
baseline of 2 years in the upper panel, and with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) optimal bandwidth of 3 years in the lower panel. The two bandwidths
yield very similar point estimates, but the wider bandwidth has significantly
smaller standard errors due to the larger sample size. For both panels, we use
a simple rectangular kernel, assigning each observation the same weight, which
can be implemented by estimating Equation 1 by Ordinary Least Squares. T
denotes the indicator for being aged above 50, while z and Tz are the controls
for a linear effect of (age-50), allowing it to differ on the left and right side of
the discontinuity. In column 1 the dependent variable is the completed duration
until re-employment, censored after 2 years, whereas the outcomes in columns
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2-4 are – more robust to job returns not or not yet observed – the fractions
re-employed after respectively 12, 15 and 18. Since we find the largest effect
after 15 and 18 months, column 5 finally uses as outcome the logarithm of the
propensity to start a new job on any given day within the first 15 months after
job loss.15
Depending on the bandwidth, eligibility for the severance payment worth 1.2
months’ after-tax salaries at the median is found to prolong non-employment
duration by between 45 and 57 days. In line with this, amongst those eligible the
fraction re-employed after 12 months is found to be between 6 and 7 percentage
points lower, that re-employed after 15 months 8 percentage points lower, and
that re-employed after 18 months between 7 and 8 percentage points lower.
The same effects can also be seen visually in Figures 2 through 5, which plot
respectively the completed non-employment duration and the three fractions
against 6-month bins of age, along with a fitted linear curve of length 2 on
each side of the threshold. The graphs show that duration is indeed increasing
and re-employment probability decreasing in age, confirming the need for a
quasi-experimental design. At the same time, despite the remaining noise, the
fractions re-employed exhibit a clear jump at age 50.
Effects for shorter and longer horizons, not displayed, go in the same di-
rection, but are smaller. This inversely U-shaped relationship between elapsed
non-employment duration and the size of the severance pay effect, with a max-
imum effect near 15 months, can be rationalized as presumably sufficient other
liquidity is still available at very short horizons, whereas at longer horizons
the job-finding propensity does generally decline due to skill depreciation and
sample selection. This is indeed what we see in the bottom panel of Figure 6,
15When censoring after 12, 18 or 24 months the point estimate is between 0 and 6 percentage
points lower in absolute terms, and slightly less significant.
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plotting the raw propensity to find a new job against the time elapsed since job
loss. The continuous line represents those aged below 50 at job loss and hence
ineligible for severance payments, whereas the broken line represents those eli-
gible. The figure shows three interesting findings. Firstly, both lines are almost
monotonously downward-sloping, implying that the propensity to start a new
job given that none has been found so far is declining over time. Secondly, the
line for those eligible is almost always below that for those eligible, implying
a lower job finding hazard for the former on most days. And finally, the dif-
ference between the two curves is largest between day 200 and day 400. The
average difference between those two lines is also captured in the results of the
Cox regression, displayed in the last column of the table: Those eligible for the
payment have, on average a 17% lower re-employment propensity than those
not eligible.
How does the size of the effect compare to the one Card et al. (2007a) found
for Austria? In their case a payment worth 2 months’ wages lowered the re-
employment probability by 8-12% on average over the first 20 weeks after job
loss. In our case, a payment worth 1.2 months’ wages at the median lowers the
re-employment probability by on average 7 percentage points, corresponding to
a relative decline of about 12%, as the average fraction reemployed after 12 to
18 months is about 0.6 (see Table 1). Hence relative to the size of the payment
our effects appear somewhat larger. One likely reason for this is the fact that we
measure the effect at later points in the spell, where many of the Austrian job
losers are presumably already back in a new job. Another is the more generous
UI: If households are willing to remain unemployed as long as they can maintain
consumption at say 80% of previous income (or any other percentage above the
UI replacement rate), then any given severance pay amount will “last longer”
14
the greater the fraction already covered by UI.16
4.2 Sensitivity Checks
The first possible concern that may arise about the credibility of our estimates
is that our controls for the effect of age may not suffice. After all, an effect
of age per se is apparent from the Figures 2 through 5 and is also reflected
in the coefficients on z and Tz in Table 3. To test this, Table 4 displays the
discontinuities in our outcomes of interest for different placebo age thresholds,
going in half-year intervals from age 47 all the way until age 51, after which
the small discontinuity at 52 will come into play. The table shows that indeed
the only age threshold at which we observe significant discontinuities in our
outcomes of interest is that at age 50.
The exclusion restriction represents another possible concern. What if other
policies that are correlated with non-employment duration do also change at
age 50? While there are discontinuities in early retirement access at ages 60
and 62, we are not aware of other policy discontinuities at age 50. One may
worry that some policy discontinuities do nonetheless exist. To explore this, we
repeat our analysis on a placebo sample of individuals who satisfy all the same
requirements as those in our main sample, except that they are separated from
plants which were not affiliated with LO-NHO and hence did not participate in
the severance pay agreements. The results of this test are displayed in Table
5. Indeed, no significant effect of being aged above 50 is found here, supporting
the view that the exclusion restriction is indeed satisfied.
16By the Paradigm of Revealed Preferences, the fact that households choose to use some
of the severance pay money for longer search durations implies that the availability of the
payment makes them better off. To see if the severance pay results in a better subsequent
job, we have followed Card et al. (2007a) and performed the analysis on wage growth from
previous to new job. Like them, however, we find no significant effects. Unfortunately, we
are not able to analyze duration on the next job (a common measure of non-pecuniary job
satisfaction) as most of the subsequent jobs have only just started by the end of our panel.
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As in any Regression Discontinuity Design, we need to explore whether there
could have been selection around the threshold. As mentioned above, sever-
ance payments under the LO-NHO agreement are made by a joint fund and
financed in a not experience-related way, thus alleviating concerns that firms
might choose to lay off (a selected group of) individuals just before they turn
50. By contrast the fund has an incentive to ensure that firms and employees
do not collude to systematically postpone layoffs until after age 50, but how
well does it enforce this in practice? A first check is to test for discontinuities
at the threshold in the density of observations, following McCrary (2008). In
the present case, this test yields a coefficient for the log difference in density of
-0.018, with a standard error of 0.134, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
no difference. In line with this, we see no discontinuity at 50 in Figure 7, which
plots the frequency of observations in our sample for each 1-month bin between
age 48 and age 52, and the same story emerges for different bin sizes.
While this suggests that there is no systematic selection of the number of
individuals to either side of the threshold, one may still worry that the individ-
uals on each side differ in type. To check this, Table 6 reports the results of
repeating our main regressions on a set of variables of which the values should
be predetermined at the time of the job separation. Here we look in particular
at the financial variables also used to investigate the plausibility of the liquidity
constraints explanation, as well as indicators for respectively higher education
(other education categories were also tried and yielded similar results), receipt of
sickness benefits in year before job loss, and the share of cases working in man-
ufacturing (again, the result of no discontinuity holds also for other sectors).
These analyses, using the exact same methodology as for our main outcome
variables, does not reveal any discontinuities at the age 50 threshold. This is
also illustrated visually in Figures 8 through 14, lending further support to the
16
view that our main findings can be given a causal interpretation.
Another concern that always arises in a Regression Discontinuity Design is
how sensitive the results are to the choice of different bandwidths or kernels.
In general the trade-off is between limited precision at very narrow bandwidths
and potential bias at too wide bandwidths. Our default choice of 2 years on
each side has been motivated by choosing the widest-possible bandwidth under
which our estimates do not get biased by effects of the next, albeit small, dis-
continuity in severance pay amounts at age 52 (cf. Figure 1). This choice yields
a relatively narrow range (and correspondingly limited precision) compared to
previous papers in the literature. Card et al. (2007a), for instance, choose a
bandwidth of 3 years per side. This said, Table 7 displays the results of vary-
ing the bandwidth. The four columns show these for the same four outcomes
(completed duration, and fractions re-employed after 12, 15 and 18 months).
The top panel provides the results from varying the bandwidth but keeping the
rectangular kernel. The bottom panel provides results using a triangular ker-
nel. In both panels we show first the results obtained under the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) “optimal bandwidth”, which varies a bit across outcome
variables, but is around 3 years in the top and around 4 years in the bottom
panel. Then we show results obtained when using half the optimal bandwidth.
The point estimates are slightly larger than with our conservative 2-year band-
width choice and are also somewhat more significant (this added significance
might be related to the small next policy discontinuity at age 52). We see these
results as confirming our main results.
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5 Liquidity Constraints vs. Mental Accounting
5.1 Mental Accounting as an alternative interpretation
In the previous section we have shown that the causal effect of lump-sum sev-
erance payments on job search duration which Card et al. (2007a) found for
Austria is also present in Norway, making it plausible that the finding applies
also to other OECD economies. But given that Norway has both a more egali-
tarian wealth distribution and a more generous welfare state than for instance
Austria or the United States, the question arises whether the severance pay
effect does indeed reflect liquidity constraints, or whether it could reflect an-
other mechanism. In particular, we suggest that conceivably households who
could financially afford longer search durations also absent the severance pay-
ments would nonetheless be unwilling to do so (and hence respond to severance
payments) because they have “earmarked” their savings for other purposes.17
Such behavior could be interpreted as an instance of mental accounting in
the spirit of Shefrin and Thaler (1988). There individuals behave as if there
coexisted two selves: A myopic "doer self" concerned only with the current pe-
riod, and a "planner self" concerned with maximizing a function of lifetime doer
utilities. If the choices of consumption each period were left to the “doer self”,
too much would be consumed in early periods, leading to a sub-optimal lifetime
path of consumption. Restricting current consumption to a level below what is
available in any given period however costs willpower. To address this problem,
the "planner self" is then assumed to place constraints on future consumption
choices already in advance, either through external commitment devices like
pension plans or internal ones like rules-of-thumb. One such rule is mental ac-
17Furthermore, Basten et al. (2012) find that some Norwegian households do indeed prepare
for unemployment by increasing their savings rate in the years before job loss, although the
use of these savings after job loss is rather limited.
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counting: Rather than considering all money as fungible, households mentally
assign all funds to different "Mental Accounts". The simplest version contains
one account for "Current Income" (C), one for "Current Assets" (A) and one
for "Future Income" (F). The rule-of-thumb then has the marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) – the fraction of each additional dollar consumed right away
– be highest for money classified as “Current Income”, lower for “Assets”, and
lowest for “Future Income”.18 In the words of Shefrin and Thaler (1988), “house-
holds treat components of their wealth as non-fungible, even in the absence of
credit rationing” (p. 609).
There are important parallels between mental accounting and standard liq-
uidity constraints. In both cases households would have the necessary (lifetime)
wealth to increase spending now, yet cannot do so because the wealth is not
available at that specific point in time or for that specific purpose. The differ-
ence is first that mental accounting arises through constraints that are internal
rather than external, and second that – given the individual’s temptation to
spend excessively absent any commitment devices – the internal constraints can
be optimal as a second-best solution. Such mental accounting could be rele-
vant also in the present context of job loss and severance payments, because
such payments, received when households lose their jobs and see regular income
drop, would likely be classified as "Current Income" and thus attract a higher
marginal propensity to consume than prior savings.
18In practice, households are likely to have more than just those three accounts, and different
households will have different accounts. Furthermore, exactly which consumption choices this
classification results in will depend on the exact "framing", i.e. on which categories each
account is defined to include and over which horizon each account is to be balanced. This
categorization into three main accounts however is thought to be a good first approximation
for the average household.
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5.2 Empirical Evidence
So if the severance pay effect identified above could also reflect mental account-
ing rather than liquidity constraints, it is worthwhile to investigate which in-
terpretation finds greater support in the data. To do so, we make use of our
information on prior wealth. Clearly, if the correct interpretation is one of liq-
uidity constraints, then the same payment should have a smaller effect on those
with higher prior wealth than on those with lower prior wealth. We can exploit
this fact to discriminate between liquidity constraints and mental accounting
if and only if plausibly the degree of mental accounting does not covary with
wealth. It is however conceivable that education or some personality trait cor-
related with education, such as discipline, will affect both the degree of mental
accounting and the amount of prior wealth held on the day of the job separation.
However, none of our results do significantly change when we control for differ-
ent measures of education. Moreover, further results suggest that the size of the
severance pay effect does not vary across individuals holding and not holding a
university degree. This suggests that plausibly the severance pay effect should
be invariant to prior wealth under mental accounting, and that hence any such
variation would speak in favor of liquidity constraints.
To proceed with our test, Table 8 augments the baseline regressions from
Table 3 with continuous measures of income (column 1), total wealth (column
2), financial wealth (column 3), and deposits (column 4) – all measured in the
year prior to the job separation. We find that the effect on all 3 re-employment
fractions is clearly decreasing in both total and financial wealth, whereas the
interaction with deposits is not statistically significant.19 In Table 9 we inter-
act instead with indicators for whether someone’s value of the different wealth
19The fact that we find significant interaction effects for total and financial wealth, but not
for deposits (which account for only a limited fraction of households’ assets) suggests that
assets other than deposits either are not as illiquid for our sample as one might have thought,
or that those households who do have them are able to borrow against them.
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measures exceeds the respective sample median. The table displays for each
outcome variable and each interaction variable the main effect, T, which is now
the effect for only those below the median, then the coefficient on the interaction
between T and the dummy for being above the median, and finally the sum of
those two. Consistent with the results from the interactions with the continuous
measures, we find that the effect is always smaller for those above than for those
below the median and in fact we always fail to reject at the 90% confidence level
the hypothesis that the effect is zero for those above the median. These results
do lend additional support to the view expressed in Card et al. (2007a) that
the severance pay effect should indeed be interpreted as evidence of liquidity
constraints.
6 Conclusion
We have documented a causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on the
duration of job search in Norway. To our knowledge, this is only the second
paper in the literature to find such a causal effect (after Card et al. (2007a)),
and the first to find it in a Scandinavian-type welfare state. This makes it likely
that such effects hold also in other OECD economies.
But given that Norway has both a more egalitarian wealth distribution and
a more generous welfare state than for instance Austria or the United States,
the question arises whether the severance pay effect does indeed reflect liquidity
constraints, or whether it could reflect another mechanism. In particular, it is
conceivable that households who could financially afford longer search durations
also absent the severance payments would nonetheless be unwilling to do so (and
hence respond to severance payments) because they have “earmarked” their
savings for other purposes. We have therefore proceeded to discuss whether
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the severance pay effect should indeed be interpreted as evidence of liquidity
constraints, as in the previous literature, or alternatively as evidence of mental
accounting behavior. To discriminate empirically between the two scenarios,
we have investigated how the size of the severance pay effect varies with prior
wealth and find it to be decreasing therein. This lends additional support to
the view expressed by Card et al. (2007a) that the observed severance pay effect
does indeed reflect liquidity constraints.
The implication of this finding is that in most OECD economies there exists
a subset of job losers who, with no or insufficiently generous unemployment
insurance, have to accept a new job offer earlier than would be optimal. An
efficient way to improve their situation would be to lend them additional re-
sources, as this policy response would not come at the cost of increased moral
hazard. Where such lending is not possible, for instance for political reasons,
the choice of the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance must still weigh
the effects of the liquidity constraints against those of potential moral hazard.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Severance Pay Amounts in USD by Age
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Note: The figure plots the Severance Pay Amount an eligible worker would have received if
laid off between 2002 and 2009, for each 6-month bin of age. Amounts have been converted
to USD at the average exchange rate prevalent in 2004.
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Figure 2: Non-Employment Duration After Job Loss
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Note: The figure plots the average duration from job loss until the next regular job against
6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50
discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 3: Fraction Re-Employed 12 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure plots the fraction re-employed after 12 months against 6-month bins of age
at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our
default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 4: Fraction Re-Employed 15 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure plots the fraction re-employed after 15 months against 6-month bins of age
at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our
default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 5: Fraction Re-Employed 18 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure plots the fraction re-employed after 18 months against 6-month bins of age
at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our
default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves and Hazard Rates
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Note: In the upper part, Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves plot the fraction still without a new
job against the number of days elapsed since job loss. It is always higher for those who lost
their job only after turning 50 and who were hence eligible for the severance payment. In
the lower part, we plot the hazard rates, i.e. the daily propensity to start a new job, against
the number of days elaped since job loss. That hazard is almost always higher for those aged
below 50 and hence not eligible for a severance payment at age 50. The difference in hazards
is biggest after about a year, suggesting that then the effect of the payments is strongest.
30
Figure 7: Frequency of Job Separations
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Note: Frequency plots of Job Separations around the threshold at age 50. Monthly bins.
Corresponding to the visual impression, an estimation of the density of observations, following
McCrary (2008), yields a coefficient of -0.018 and a standard error of 0.134, thus failing to
reject the null hypothesis of no difference in densities.
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Figure 8: Household Wealth in the Year before Job Loss
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Figure 9: Household Financial Wealth in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figures plot respectively households’ total wealth (upper) and financial wealth
(lower) against 6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each
side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 10: Household Deposits in the Year before Job Loss
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Figure 11: Household Income in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figures plot respectively households’ deposits (upper) and income (lower) against
6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50
discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 12: Share of Households with Higher Education
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Figure 13: Share of Households receiving Sickness Money
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Note: The figures plot respectively the fraction of households in which the husband has
higher education (upper) and the fraction receiving sickness money (lower), both against 6-
month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50
discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 14: Share of Households Employed in Manufacturing
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Note: The figure plots the fraction employed in the manufacturing sector against 6-month bins
of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity,
for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Estimation And Placebo Samples, Age 48-52
Estimation (N=2,882) Placebo (N=11,065)
Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median
Year 2,004 4.25 2,005 2,004 4.37 2,004
Age 50.02 1.17 50.02 50.00 1.16 50.00
Tenure (in years) 15.90 5.48 14.20 16.06 5.49 14.52
Dur NonEmpl (in days) 273.77 473.33 63.00 318.09 537.13 95.00
Fraction Re-Employed After (in %):
12 Months 56.94 53.66
15 Months 59.92 57.13
18 Months 62.87 59.99
Education (in %)
Less than Highschool 39.3 46.0
High School 25.2 30.7
College 35.4 23.3
Education Main Field (in %)
General 28.3 33.2
Humanities 4.4 1.7
Teaching 5.7 1.3
Econ/Adm 12.5 9.3
Science/Eng 33.9 45.4
Health/Sports 4.2 1.0
Services 6.1 3.7
Industry (in %)
Manufacturing 14.0 32.9
Construction 8.7 7.9
Wholesale / Retail 14.8 19.8
Transport / Communication 10.4 9.8
Real estate 8.5 10.9
Public adm / Defense 12.6 0.2
Education 8.4 1.0
Health / Social work 6.1 2.4
Financial Variables (in 2004 USD):
Annual Earnings 42,671 22,098 37,001 43,109 23,368 37,965
Monthly Earnings After Tax 2,489 1,289 2,158 2,515 1,363 2,215
HH Annual Earnings 56,933 29,282 52,342 58,360 31,274 52,936
Deposits 12,924 28,210 3,349 14,600 30,780 3,611
HH Deposits 17,461 34,343 5,591 19,530 36,489 6,386
Financial Wealth 31,475 90,124 4,686 32,878 83,586 5,869
HH Financial Wealth 39,446 103,107 8,095 41,053 96,484 10,231
Wealth 72,151 117,529 41,962 76,259 113,280 44,633
HH Wealth 88,287 133,935 54,462 93,457 129,952 56,979
Note: This table displays in the left panel summary statistics for the estimation sample of 2,882 households,
aged between 48 and 52 and satisfying all the criteria described in Section 3. Additionally, summary statistics
for the placebo sample of 11,065 households (satisfying all the same criteria except that the plant of separation
was not participating in the severance pay agreements) are displayed in the right panel. For the duration of
non-employment, summary statistics are reported for households who have found jobs within the sample window
(before 31 Dec 2010). Education Fields and Industries with shares smaller than 4% are omitted. Financial
variables and income are measured two years before the year of job separation and the values are denoted in 2004
USD.
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Table 2: Severance Pay Amounts In NOK By Age And
Period
Age Oct 1993- Oct 1995- Mar 1998- Aug 2002-
 49 0 0 0 0
50 12,000 14,400 14,400 18,000
51 12,000 14,400 14,400 18,000
52 13,000 15,600 15,600 19,500
53 13,000 15,600 15,600 19,500
54 15,500 18,600 18,600 23,300
55 15,500 18,600 18,600 23,300
56 18,000 21,500 21,500 26,900
57 18,000 21,500 21,500 26,900
58 20,000 24,000 24,000 30,000
59 22,500 27,000 27,000 33,800
60 24,000 28,800 28,800 36,000
61 26,000 31,200 31,200 39,000
62 28,500 34,200 57,000 57,000
63 28,500 34,200 45,600 45,600
64 34,200 34,200 34,200 34,200
65 22,800 22,800 22,800 22,800
66 11,400 11,400 11,400 11,400
Note: The table displays predicted Severance Pay in NOK by
age and period, according to the Severance Pay agreements be-
tween the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) and the
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). For details, see
http://www.sluttvederlag.no/. For a plot of predicted amounts
(in the last period) in 2004 USD, see Figure 1.
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Table 3: Baseline Specification, Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After: Cox
Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months Regression
Panel A: Bandwidth = 2:
T 45.16 -6.20∗ -7.76∗∗ -7.06∗∗ -0.17
(33.43) (3.56) (3.54) (3.55) (0.10)
z 20.20 -1.41 -0.90 -2.44 -0.03
(19.65) (2.17) (2.15) (2.11) (0.06)
Tz -10.66 0.64 0.94 3.31 0.02
(28.98) (3.16) (3.12) (3.07) (0.09)
Constant 417.10∗∗∗ 59.78∗∗∗ 63.39∗∗∗ 64.80∗∗∗
(24.28) (2.60) (2.55) (2.53)
N 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,732
Panel B: Bandwidth = 3 (IK Optimal):
T 57.57∗∗ -7.07∗∗ -8.09∗∗∗ -7.82∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗
(27.74) (2.99) (2.97) (2.94) (0.08)
z 0.06 0.06 0.34 -0.10 0.01
(10.50) (1.17) (1.16) (1.13) (0.03)
Tz 6.84 -0.22 -0.39 0.26 -0.03
(15.83) (1.73) (1.70) (1.68) (0.05)
Constant 402.54∗∗∗ 60.59∗∗∗ 64.20∗∗∗ 66.48∗∗∗
(20.11) (2.17) (2.10) (2.07)
N 4,367 4,367 4,367 4,367 4,142
Note: The table provides the regression discontinuity estimates based on Equation 1 and
using our baseline bandwidth of 2 years on each side in the upper panel, and the bandwidth
of 3 years (IK optimal) in the lower. T is the indicator for being aged above 50 and hence
eligible for severance pay, z is the age control (age-50) on the left side and Tz allows another
age control on the right side of the threshold. The effect on non-employment duration in days
is estimated with durations censored after 2 years. Standard errors, clustered by plant, are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Placebo Plants: Baseline Specification, Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After: Cox
Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months Regression
T 1.265 -0.460 -0.748 -0.799 0.039
(12.113) (1.887) (1.859) (1.864) (0.060)
z 10.144 -1.394 -1.167 -0.944 -0.051
(7.509) (1.173) (1.158) (1.144) (0.037)
Tz -1.462 0.387 0.710 0.551 -0.010
(10.602) (1.653) (1.639) (1.617) (0.052)
Constant 375.043*** 53.702*** 57.146*** 60.116***
(8.652) (1.537) (1.513) (1.477)
N 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 10,569
Note: This table repeats the main regressions from Table 3 for our placebo sample of in-
dividuals separated from plants that were not affiliated with LO-NHO and hence did not
participate in the severance pay agreements (see Section 3 for details). As before, we estimate
Equation 1, using our baseline bandwidth of 2 years on each side. T is the indicator for being
aged above 50 and hence eligible for severance pay, z is the control for (age-50) on the left
side, and Tz allows for another age control on the right side of the threshold. The effect on
non-employment duration in days is estimated with durations censored after 2 years, and so
is the Cox regression. Standard errors, clustered by plant, are reported in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Alternative Optimal Bandwidths: Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After
Rectangular Kernel: Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months
Optimal Bandwidth 37.90** -7.06** -8.48*** -7.72***
(18.65) (2.99) (3.02) (2.78)
N 4,391 4,367 4,352 4,796
0.5*Opt Bw 40.58 -7.17* -7.83* -5.71
(26.51) (4.19) (4.20) (4.01)
N 2,172 2,153 2,146 2,363
Optimal Bandwidth 3.02 3.00 2.99 3.32
Triangular Kernel:
Optimal Bandwidth 39.11** -7.56*** -8.50*** -7.65***
(18.05) (2.88) (2.88) (2.70)
N 5,594 5,530 5,456 6,184
0.5* Opt Bw 29.27 -6.53 -7.43* -6.37*
(25.62) (4.06) (4.09) (3.84)
N 2,747 2,725 2,684 3,037
Optimal Bandwidth 4.15 3.81 3.76 4.23
Note: This table displays only the coefficients, and in parentheses the standard errors
clustered by plant, on being aged above 50, now for different bandwidths and kernels. The
top panel follows our main estimates in using a rectangular kernel, with equal weighting of
observations. Instead of the censored regressions from Table 3, we here use the completed
duration measure without censoring. The bottom panel uses a triangular kernel, putting
greater weight on observations closer to the threshold. Within each panel, we display first
the estimates based on the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth and then
those based on half the optimal bandwidth. The respective optimum bandwidth itself is
displayed at the bottom of each panel. Stars denote statistical significance as follows: *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Stratifying By Continuous Wealth Measures (W)
Income Wealth Fin Wealth Deposits
Completed T 44.01 49.02 48.30 45.24
Duration (33.44) (33.30) (33.36) (33.44)
T*W -64.17∗ -30.64 -32.75 17.72
(34.68) (37.05) (36.85) (34.07)
Re-Employed After T -5.96 -6.04* -5.96 -5.84
12 Months: (3.63) (3.62) (3.62) (3.63)
T*W 2.90 6.56** 11.89*** -3.65
(5.06) (2.68) (3.60) (3.29)
Re-Employed After T -7.38** -7.53** -7.47** -7.32**
15 Months: (3.66) (3.65) (3.65) (3.66)
T*W 4.97 7.16*** 11.56*** -2.68
(5.29) (2.52) (3.87) (3.31)
Re-Employed After T -7.07* -7.24** -7.17** -7.03*
18 Months: (3.62) (3.60) (3.60) (3.61)
T*W 6.69 7.37*** 12.39*** -1.85
(5.07) (2.54) (3.88) (3.40)
N 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,882
Cox T -0.16 -0.17∗ -0.17∗ -0.17
Regression (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
T*W 0.13 0.19∗ 0.17 -0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732
Note: This table provides the regression discontinuity estimates of Equation 1, augmented
by continuous measures of wealth and income (deflated to 2004 values), as well as their
interaction with each of the other regressors. Each column uses a different income or
wealth measure as indicated. The top panel uses as outcome variable non-employment
duration in days, the following ones use the fraction re-employed after respectively 12,
15 and 18 months and the lower panel the standard Cox Regression. Standard errors,
clustered by plant, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Stratifying By Wealth Measures: Above Median (D)
Income Wealth Fin Wealth Deposits
Completed T 102.38∗∗ 143.45∗∗∗ 68.30 134.89∗∗∗
Duration (47.04) (48.96) (47.09) (47.58)
T*D -113.69∗ -189.23∗∗∗ -44.75 -172.44∗∗
(66.94) (71.24) (66.55) (68.20)
T + T*D -11.31 -45.78 -23.55 -37.56
Prob > F(1,2875) 0.81 0.34 0.62 0.43
Re-Employed After T -9.71* -8.25 -14.95*** -15.87***
12 Months: (5.40) (5.45) (5.39) (5.41)
T*D 7.87 4.95 18.04** 19.84***
(7.64) (7.65) (7.63) (7.63)
T + T*D -1.83 -3.29 3.09 3.98
Prob > F(1,2875) 0.73 0.54 0.57 0.46
Re-Employed After T -12.20** -9.35* -15.09*** -16.41***
15 Months: (5.34) (5.40) (5.36) (5.38)
T*D 9.85 4.16 15.50** 17.88**
(7.56) (7.57) (7.56) (7.55)
T + T*D -2.34 -5.19 0.41 1.46
Prob > F(1,2875) 0.66 0.33 0.94 0.78
Re-Employed After T -12.73** -9.95* -15.40*** -16.51***
18 Months: (5.26) (5.32) (5.30) (5.32)
T*D 11.50 5.95 16.64** 18.58**
(7.46) (7.48) (7.47) (7.46)
T + T*D -1.22 -4.01 1.23 2.07
Prob > F(1,2875) 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.69
N 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,882
Cox Regression T -0.29 -0.40 -0.23 -0.41
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
T*D 0.27 0.47 0.12 0.48
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
T + T*D -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.07
Prob > Chi2(1) 0.85 0.65 0.45 0.61
N 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732
Note: This table provides the regression discontinuity estimates of Equation 1, augmented by an indicator
variable for whether the value of different income and wealth measures (all deflated to 2004 values) exceeds
the sample median, as well as interactions between that indicator and the other regressors. Standard errors,
clustered by plant, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table does also
provide the sum of the coefficient on being above the threshold and the coefficient on the interaction of the
threshold dummy with the dummy for income or wealth above the median. The p-value for the F-test with
the null hypothesis that this sum is zero is reported in the line below. None of these 20 tests rejects this Null
hypotheses at the 10% level.
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